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A second element of context is the attractiveness of the presidential year ballot in terms of other statewide races. Another reform movement aimed at insulating state and local races from the influence of the presidential race led states to shift gubernatorial races to congressional election years. The presidential election now has fewer races to attract voters to the polls. This note estimates the effects of primaries and statewide races on presidential election turnout in the U.S. elections of 1976, 1980, and 1984.
THE ELECTION FREQUENCY HYPOTHESIS
In the context of a single presidential election year, the source of multiple elections is presidential and state primaries. Among states that hold presidential primaries, some conduct their primaries for state offices separately from the presidential primary. Some Southern and border states hold state run-off primaries as well. These states may hold three primaries and a general election in the same year.
The logic behind the election frequency hypothesis is that frequent elections impose opportunity costs on the campaign and party organizations that function as political intermediaries between candidates and citizens (Boyd, 1981 (Boyd, , 1986 ).' The resources (money and volunteer labor) that are available to electoral organizations to persuade and mobilize voters are limited. A sequence of primaries in a state may severely strain scarce resources. Resources devoted to early contests may not be available in the general election.
Moreover, the positive effects on turnout of expenditures of money and staff effort may dissipate with time. If a primary is held in late winter or early spring, political ads and organizational contacts may be forgotten by the November election. Thus, a corollary of the election frequency hypothesis is that the more distant in time a primary is from the general election, the more negative will be its effect on general election turnout. A further prediction, then, is that spring primaries will depress general election turnout more than fall primaries.
From this perspective the negative effect of party primaries on general election turnout is not likely to surface among the core electorate characterized by high interest and information. The core electorate is likely to vote in both primary and general elections. Rather the effect, if we observe it, will be among the peripheral electorate-those people whose participation is most dependent on a high stimulus campaign and a mobilization effort. These voters are least likely to vote in a party primary but may vote in a general election if their interest can be engaged.
The party primary variables in the present study are redefined as indirect 'Boyd (1986, pp. 93-95 ) discusses other explanations of the election frequency hypothesis that do not depend on the concept of opportunity costs. measures of their opportunity costs for the general election. These opportunity costs are not exactly equal to the total candidate expenditures in the primaries. The amount a candidate or party can raise for the primary and general elections is not a fixed sum. Victorious primary candidates can use their electoral success to generate additional support for the general election. And, public funding provides new funding for the presidential race in the general election.
Nevertheless, even if they are not fixed, donations of campaign funds and volunteer time are still limited, particularly in the nonpresidential contests on the ballot that do not benefit from public funding. Some portion of the scarce resources expended in the primaries cannot be replaced. Most particularly, the human resources available to party and campaign organizations may not be replaced if the volunteers grow weary of the effort or suffer the disappointment of having a favored candidate lose in the primary. I assume that the degree to which a primary consumes such resources varies with the number and importance of the offices being contested. This is the basis for the measures of the party primary election calendar variables.
A party primary variable is a summated index composed from the presidential, gubernatorial, senatorial, and congressional races in each state. Each statewide race (presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial) in each party is weighted equally and is scored .5. For example, if both parties nominate senatorial candidates in a primary, the Senate races add one to the party primary index. A state with nominations for all three statewide races in both parties on the primary ballot would have a total score of three. Each congressional primary race in each party is scored .5 divided by the number of congressional districts in the state, so that if all congressional races in a state were contested in a primary, the sum of the congressional races would equal a statewide race.
The primaries are also divided into spring and fall categories in order to test the corollary prediction that primaries more distant in time from the general election have a particularly large impact on the general election. Since almost all primaries take place either before the first week of June or after the middle of August, August 1 is the date that demarcates spring and fall primaries. The measure for spring primaries, when the presidential race may be on the ballot along with the other three statewide races, is continuous and varies between zero and four. Since fall primaries and run-off primaries lack the presidential race, these indices are continuous variables with a theoretical range of zero to three. Of course, the actual scores for run-off primaries are much less than three, and they are zero for the large majority of respondents who live in states that do not have run-off primaries. Table 1 The dependent variable is turnout in the general election with survey reports of voting validated by checks against official records. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, the model is tested by a probit analysis. The probit coefficients in table 1 have been transformed so that they have a straightforward interpretation. As transformed, these coefficients are simply the estimated effect on the probability of voting of a one unit change in the independent variable, when this change in the independent variable is meacloseness of the primary victory (Kenney and Rice, 1987; Geer, 1986; Born, 1981; and Ware, 1979 For dummy variables Married, Nonwhite, Hispanic, Unemployed, and Republican ID, the low value is overall grand mean probability of voting and the high value is 1. For the dummy variables Spring Primary, Fall Primary, Southern residence and Gubernatorial race, the low value is 0 and the high value is the overall grand mean probability of voting. For closing date of registration, low value is 10 and high value is 30. A T-value greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96 is statistically significant at the .05 level, two-tailed. would have been the case if there had been a gubernatorial race in every state in these elections?" The answer is that turnout would have been 67%, or 6% higher than if no state had held a gubernatorial race. Therefore, the removal of gubernatorial races from presidential ballots has almost certainly contributed to declining turnout in postwar elections.
A TEST OF THE MODEL ON THREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Interestingly, the effect of Senate races on presidential year turnout is insignificant. The explanation may be that both state public employees and candidate and party organizations have much more at stake in the outcome of a governor's race than a Senate race. State patronage jobs are an example (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, pp. 95-101). These stakes may lead state organizations to put greater resources into voter mobilization efforts for gubernatorial races. It may also be true that gubernatorial races attract a different constituency than presidential and senatorial races. If presidential and senatorial races raise similar issues of federal policy, senatorial races may not attract voters independently of the presidential race. However, gubernatorial races may present a number of distinctively state-related issues, such as state taxes and expenditures, and may draw additional voters to the November election.
This finding that gubernatorial elections increase presidential year turnout while senatorial elections do not is not at variance with other studies. This analysis, along with that of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) are the only studies that have come to my attention that examine the impact of both gubernatorial and senatorial races in presidential years. Wolfinger and Rosenstone also found the effect of Senate races to be insignificant and did not include the variable in their final models. In contrast, they found the effects of gubernatorial races to be positive and significant, although their exceptionally large samples (unlike mine) allowed them to specify that the effect was confined to patronage states (p. 99).
Seemingly The coefficient for the very small number of run-off primaries is essentially zero. Ignoring the run-off primaries, the combined effect of the primaries nationwide is the sum of the effects for spring and fall primaries, or a total of 5%.
We may pause to wonder what might happen if election laws were changed with the sole concern of increasing presidential year turnout. Two reform movements, the direct primary and the shift of gubernatorial elections to congressional election years, have had the unfortunate effect of reducing general election turnout. It may well be that other benefits projected by the reforms' supporters justify them in spite of these adverse effects. The shift of gubernatorial races to congressional years may increase turnout in these elections. Party primaries may also provide benefits that offset their negative impact on turnout. For example, Geer (1986) argues that a further set of reforms of presidential primaries would increase the capacity of parties to nominate candidates with broad electoral support. It is not my point, then, that the negative effects of primaries on general election turnout in any way settles the debate on the merits of the expanded use of presidential primaries (cf. Crotty, 1977; Shafer, 1983; Polsby, 1983; and Reiter, 1985) . Nonetheless, the impact of state and presidential primaries on general election turnout is troubling, and the effect ought to be considered in debates on optimal procedures for nominating candidates.
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